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How like a (Fig) Leaf 
 
How unlike a book title. How unrecognizable in the humanities (Donna Haraway’s 
book-length interview How like a leaf was published in 2000). The initial invocation 
of metaphor only grants initial comfort – how like. We are uncertain of the subject of 
the comparison. Is Haraway herself ‘like a leaf’? Is the interview form, is the printed 
page? What could such an open-ended comparison convey? I’m beginning here 
because this figure from this thinker, one with a PhD in Biology, inspires me 
regarding possible paths of thought that may well generate differences but do not 
police an absolute divide between the humanities and the sciences, as much as my 
training in the former renders these paths hard graft. It also speaks to Haraway’s 
refusal to endorse what she names a Western ethnocentric mode of thought that would 
separate nature from culture, as if that were possible. On the side of curiosity and on 
the side of play, she entreats us to view: 
<SLIDE> 
‘Biology [as] an inexhaustible source of troping. It is certainly full of 
metaphor, but it is more than metaphor… biology is not merely a metaphor 
that illuminates something else, but an inexhaustible source of getting at the 
non-literalness of the world.’1 
 
Her repeated use of ‘inexhaustible’ suggests the fallibility of taxonomies of speciated 
difference as it is classically thought, and speaks to a reciprocity with what Jacques 
Derrida calls limitrophy, or an understanding of difference as that which grows. 
Growth, cultivation, and the work of figuration: there is a graft here, for me, between 
the work of Haraway and Derrida and also between academic attention and 
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horticultural practice. Haraway explicitly cautions us against the invocation of 
gardens. Gardens, she notes, tend to revert to the Garden, recalling Nature to a state of 
innocence and the requirement that she must be saved, fenced off, guarded, or is 
already guarded, fenced off or saved by an impenetrable veil or symbolic bar.2 
Countering the metaphysics of Nature as guarded Garden, Haraway insists on a 
creative interleaving of tropos and topos, figure and place. This is a geotropism, she 
says, muddying the dominant figure in the history of rhetoric that is the sun and its 
supposedly all-pervasive command of a heliotropology.  This geotropism is a general 





Haraway’s regular enthusiasm for the mud, and for our always non-innocent 
entanglements with the world notwithstanding, this symposium continues to cultivate 
attention towards a problem recently diagnosed by James Wandersee and Elizabeth 
Schussler as Plant Blindness – that is to say that humans tend towards noticing what 
is within 0 and 15% below their field of vision.3 So much for the overblown register 
of vision in so very many narratives of the human. Narratives accounting for the 
evolution of Homo Sapiens and the individual subject formation of human beings are 
famously magnetized by visual figures. To index but two examples: in the wider 
species case, Freud accounts for the emergence of human bipedalism as intrinsically 
bound up with the privilege of sight, notably over and above smell with its fecund 
fascination with our animal organs of excretion and reproduction. In the narrower 
case, Lacan sketched a mirror phase that would provide a visual anchor, a bounded 
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self-image, for the sensations otherwise exceeding what would become the human 
subject. In psychoanalytic accounts, however, the field of vision is neither all-seeing 
nor circumscribed technically by a few degrees, rather it is psychically filtered by 
projection, foreclosure, displacement and other defensive mechanisms to avoiding 
seeing the difference of the sexual other. I name these old problems, that persistently 
live on, because they may yet be part of the same story, even thought they do not 
appear to address the vegetal, at least at first blush.   
<SLIDE> 
Something of the unease that Derrida felt before his cat, one morning, in that 
infamous bathroom scene, afflicts me now, navigating a space and a time that is shot 
through with histories that seek to determine and wholly delimit such encounters.  But 
the elemental academic frameworks of discipline, method, archive, subjects and 
objects are suffering a dehiscence, at least they are if we are to take deconstruction 
seriously.  The invitation to speak to the topic of Plant Blindness appealed to the 
poetic graft of the pleasure of cultivating new thought, alongside a certain concern 
regarding what might come to light in the autobiography or autopsychobiography or 
autobotanicography of what is parsed through the practice of gardening in my life. In 
the sudden and recent proliferation of humanities scholars turning their attention to 
the vegetal, Derrida is frequently invoked. This is for several reasons. One is simply 
in acknowledgement of the profound energy that his posthumous book, The Animal 
that Therefore I am has catalyzed in what is called, for want of a better name, Animal 
Studies. There is, perhaps, a kind of wish for the same kind of boost to the growth of 
‘Plant Studies’ (which again I am naming only provisionally).  Sometimes this 
manifests as a rebuke to Derrida for putting off plants in the second volume of his 
seminars on The Beast and the Sovereign (Jeffrey Nealon’s Plant Theory quotes him 
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to that effect) sometimes it shows up as a hermeneutic device to explore the question 
of what might have happened had the encounter between Derrida and his cat, 
concerned the possibility of a vegetal rather than feline ‘primary mirror’ (Giovanni 
Aloi). Part of the path that I am setting out upon here will also involve another return 
to this book in light of the wider project of deconstruction. While it remains the case 
that many Animal Studies scholars are producing illuminating work that may well 
concentrate on particular animals or focus on particular cases of injustice against 
particular animals, the decisive contribution of Derrida dilates around his insight that  
 
The “question of animality” is not one question among others […] it also 
represents the limit upon which all the great questions are formed and 
determined, […] all the concepts that attempt to delimit what is “proper to 
man,” the essence and future of humanity, ethics, politics, law, “human 
rights,” “crimes against humanity,” “genocide,” etc.4 
 
This does not mean that animals are the most important beings to consider: Derrida’s 
work is not a politics of representation nor one of equality or symmetry that would 
aim at adequately accommodating all living beings in the picture (with each in their 
rightful place).  Rather, it is to interrogate the way that the pernicious concept of the 
animal as supposedly discrete from the human divides up life, up to and including 
who may be put to death. ‘The concept’ here indexes the Western metaphysical 
imaginary in general, but the specular dialectical tradition that raises man above 
nature in particular and substantially contributes to the concept of the subject before 
the law. The laws formed by that imaginary barely consider vegetal lives as such at all 
(and where they do it tends to fall under localized property law): it is indigenous and 
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other eco-activists that are insisting that law should imagine natural environments, 
rivers say, as persons with rights rather than belonging to persons or nations with 
rights, or that ecocide should be legally established as a criminal, thus punishable, 
offence, my path today will not consist of adding plants in to existing juridical 
structures (as urgent as that is, given the ‘catastrofuck’ of continued climate change 
denial). If there is a ‘plant question’ it will be extensive and it will continue the work 
of ‘soliciting’ the concepts on which we have relied, consciously or unconsciously 
(soliciting in the sense that Derrida etymologically unpacks, as a shaking to the core).5     
 
As with so very many other readers of The Animal that Therefore I am, that bathroom 
scene has caught my attention. This is not just because of the novelty of the 
philosopher and a cat, nor just that philosophy and the everyday coincide in a scene in 
order to speak critically of subjectivity in light of our shameful conceptual inheritance 
that bars the homogenized mass of non-human animals from all the powers believed 
to be possessed by the subject that calls himself ‘Man’. But, magnified in the context 
of this symposium, it is the way that nudity, or its constitutive impossibility, is 
disseminated across the whole essay from the desire conditionally expressed in the 
opening sentence, namely that Derrida ‘would like to entrust’ himself before his 
audience with ‘naked words’.  
<SLIDE> 
Breaking that opening sentence is the easy to overlook clause: ‘were it possible’.  
Following the traces of Derrida’s marked use of the conditional – I would, were it 
possible - allows his cultivation of difference vis-à-vis our violent conceptual heritage 
to take root. This fragile guide is especially necessary given his unorthodox 
presentation of ‘argument,’ which is achieved as much at the level of style as it is by 
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more evident exegesis. It can also ameliorate the difficulty for readers in recognising 
the shared ground between the more obvious dogma maintained by the concept of ‘the 
animal’ (such as ‘the animal cannot mourn’) and what may initially appear descriptive 
– ‘the animal is not nude’.  <SLIDE> 
Thus, when all the supposed capacities belonging to man are put into question – and 
Derrida names ‘speech or reason, the logos, history, laughing, mourning, burial, the 
gift, etc’  - they are specifically put into question in so far as they are identified with 
autonomous capacity.6 Hence, Man’s professed ability to speak, etc, versus the 
animal’s alleged privation of speech. The ability to dress oneself, the ability to be 
nude (assuming a self-consciousness, an embarrassment and a shame), are thus roped 
into conceptual coincidence with the autonomous ambition of Man, but no matter how 
counter-intuitively Derrida implies something very different.  I’ll come to his 
implications, which regard the living in general, not just Man and not just nonhuman 
animals, in a few moments. 
<SLIDE> 
While most of the vast amount of critical writing on Derrida’s encounter with his cat 
has focused on his endorsement of the notion that an animal might gaze back at or 
respond to a human, one portentous aspect – briefly addressed as such in the essay – 
has garnered comparatively little interest. Drawing on his unease, his shame before 
his cat, Derrida remarks that ‘We would […] have to think shame and technology 
together, as the same ‘subject’.’7 Yes, there is another ‘would’. It is planted in a 
garden, the Garden. Starting with an ‘In the beginning’ and desiring naked words, the 
ludicrously time-travelling answer that Derrida’s text gives to the question of how far 
can one plant take you is to the origin of time. This is not to summon Stephen 
Hawking. Rather, it is to indict the Judaeo-Christian onto-theological story of history. 
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It is to disperse the origin tale that Genesis consecrates, implanting sin within 
autobiography and positioning vegetation as to be appropriated in the single gesture 
of seeking cover behind the leaves of a Fig, a story doubled by Freud when he 
positions woman’s sole invention as that of weaving cloth in memory of the cover up 
performed by her own ‘bush’.  
 
Yet even a sophisticated thinker, and indeed the translator of The Animal that 
Therefore I am, David Wills, hedges his bets when writing of the seizure of the fig 
leaf as an affirmation that shame and technology are as one, a ‘blushing machine’ as 
he says.8 He is certainly aware that this seizure, this sublation, this overcoming of 
nature in order to forge clothing, with clothing then standing for Man’s technological 
grasp upon the world, is that of dialectics (an idealist discourse that Derrida condemns 
as inadequate in itself and continuing to license an ethical horror show of ever-greater 
proportions). But in expanding ‘shame and technology’ to include at least some 
nonhuman animals (those that mate) Wills drops critical attention to both sexual 
difference and the Garden in which shame and technology are ostensibly bedded. He 
lets fall the nuance that Derrida’s conditional ‘woulds’ have nurtured regarding the 
muddying of the naked truth and the scattering of any notion of an original sin.  
 
Out of the seeming obviousness of clothing as a distinctively human technology 
motivated by the dialectical overcoming of weakness [the weakness of nudity welded 
to sin] – versus the seeming obviousness of the absence of clothing as such on other 
species authorized by their alleged perfect adaptation to an allegedly ahistorical 
nature, Derrida refashions the stakes. 'Clothing' becomes a particular instance of a 
wider condition. This wider condition is that of hiding.9 Hiding is a general condition, 
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clothing and shame become demoted to particular instances. And even that gesture of 
withdrawal – hiding- can never be complete: this is not an alternative between 
absence or presence. We are none of us revealed in the naked truth of presence, none 
of ‘us’ at all. There is no reason to think that once the conceptual divide between 
‘man’ and ‘the animal’ is dismantled, the onto-theological Garden dug over, and the 
differences between living things welcomed as a site of growth that this would not 
also affect vegetal lives. Vegetal lives - and not just the Fig Tree that a certain 
guerrilla gardener hid amongst less showy shrubs in urban South London - are also 
partly revealed, partly concealed, never fully present.  While it is the case that Derrida 
does not devote such lengthy attention to plants as he does to animals, his earliest 
writings radically extend ‘auto-affection’ as an inherently open structure of relation to 
self to ‘[a]ll living things’ [the auto- is really a hetero-].10 To expose at least 
something of both Derrida’s possible vegetal encounters and the ways in which sexual 
differences might also be cultivated rather than shamed, I will turn briefly to Michael 





Marder reconstructs a scene of reflection with regard to vegetation in the second book 
of his recent plant trilogy, The Philosopher’s Plant.11 The book’s twelve seductive 
chapters each explore a philosopher and ‘their’ plant. Yet in his zeal to propagate 
plants within our philosophical and ethical attention, even Marder can under-
investigate the figures he suggests have escaped attention hitherto. In the case of 
‘Derrida’s Sunflowers,’ Marder prefaces his discussion with Derrida’s reminiscences 
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of his early life in Algeria. In the book of ‘Plato’s Plane Tree,’ ‘Irigaray’s Waterlily’ 
and ‘Derrida’s Sunflowers’, Marder remains oddly uninterested in Jean Paul Sartre’s 
Chestnut Tree. For the teenage Derrida, Marder notes, allowed himself to pause from 
reading the novel in his hands to be luxuriantly caught up in the ‘lush vegetation’ that 
surrounds him in La Ferrière Square.12 Emphasising that this reading scene is ‘full of 
mirrors’ between times, places and modes of philosophy, Marder tells us that the 
novel dilating Derrida’s attention was Sartre’s Nausea, yet he disregards the vegetal 
encounter marking that very text (an encounter that critics refer to as a metonymy for 
the entire novel).13 That encounter, even as it spurred the disorienting Nausea of the 
novel’s title, is blindsided. The distance that Algeria’s vegetation implants in Derrida, 
and the difference in affect gleaned from his text, becomes all the more mysterious 
since it is denuded of all contrast with Sartre’s disturbance by the chestnut tree. 
Marder instead truncates Derrida’s contemplation for a generalized and rather 
formalized figure of differance (acting as the pretext for his misguided accusation that 
Derrida is only interested in the ‘flowers of rhetoric’).  
 
Can it simply be that verdant surroundings dispel readerly concentration? Of course 
they can. In the spirit of mirroring Derrida and Sartre, Marder tells us that the latter 
also ‘looks up to plants’, but he prunes out the sickness, the existential nausea in this 
literary archive prompted by the very roots of what Randy Laist refers to as ‘the most 
famous tree in all existential philosophy’ - Sartre’s Chestnut.14  
<SLIDE> 
It’s fame is such that a Chestnut tree graces the cover of a recent collection of 
criticism - Sartre’s Nausea: text, context intertext  - even as its mere 5 references to 
the tree all orient it as the metonymy of the experience of nausea before a meaningless 
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world. Laist, writing in the context of ‘plant horror narratives’, claims Nausea as 
exactly that, suggesting that the pernicious presence of this Chestnut tree ranged 
beyond existentialism as such and contributed to the creeping vegetal horror 
expressed in such films as the Invasion of the Body Snatchers [1956] and The Day of 
the Triffids [1962].  
 
Brief though Derrida’s recollection of vegetation may be within his essay concerning 
the journal, Les Temps Modernes, associated with Sartre, it neither devolves into a 
generic idea of difference nor does the recollection propagate any negative affect. 
Naming the roots is a citation, naming the possibility of the world as ‘too much’ is a 
citation, or a graft of Sartre’s existential horror in a Parisian park into what was then 
French Algeria.  Transplanting them, Derrida wonders how he will and will not write 
like that, the transplantation does not clone. Given that Sartre’s anti-hero, Roquentin, 
is overwhelmed by the tree roots, become ‘monstrous lumps’ that are finally 
described as ‘naked, with a frightful and obscene nakedness,’ and altogether ‘too 
much,’ perhaps Derrida’s scene with the little cat is a lesson in how not to write like 
Sartre. While Derrida’s unease before his cat dismantles the conceptual inheritance 
that would keep the feline forever the same, closed within its category, supine before 
the erect human, the experience does not flatline into equivalence or meaninglessness 
or boredom as it does for Roquentin, even when the garden ‘smiles’ at him.15  
 
How like a flower 
<SLIDE> 
There are only scattered references to plants in the work of Luce Irigaray. However, 
with the encouragement of Marder and, importantly, the work of Elaine Miller in 
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foregrounding ‘efflorescence’ in Irigaray, insight into vegetal being may yet be 
gleaned. Given Irigaray’s style, which often invokes Western philosophical traditions 
only to give quite other emphases to their key terms, a ‘method’ that puts her close to 
Derrida, this is not surprising.  While vegetal figures crop up affirmatively and 
processually across Derrida’s work, the grafting of contexts, the dehiscence of 
concepts and the dissemination of any seed, while Derrida insists affirmatively that 
sexual and animal differences traverse the same horizon, it is Irigaray that explicitly 
doubles back to the identification of women with plants, as it is dug in by 
philosophers from Aristotle to Hegel. Joined under the concept ‘passivity,’ this union 
classically serves as the dumping ground for the negatives, all the privations that the 
subject that calls himself man fears to find in himself. Irigaray does not counter this 
history by arguing for equality through claiming that women too must uproot from the 
imagined stasis of natural origins and pull themselves erect into fellow dynamic 
political actors. Rather,  
 
Her so-called passivity would not […] be part of an active/passive pair of 
opposites but would signify a different economy, a different relation to nature 
[…] A matter, therefore, not of pure receptivity but of a movement of growth 
that never estranges itself from corporeal existence in a natural milieu.16 
 
Irigaray thus works to transmute feminine sexual difference with the vegetal such that 
there would be overlap between, say the auto-affective gesture of at least two lips in 
contact blurring inside and outside, blurring visible and invisible, sight and touch, 
conceptual and sensible, with the auto-affective gesture of, say, tulips, blurring sight 
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and touch, conceptual and sensible, vegetation and the flesh as well as – to pressure 
Irigaray – masculine and feminine.17 
 
Rather than an agony of shame in the grip of an onto-theological concept, an opening 
emerges that cultivates sexual differences that are neither anthropocentric nor zoo-
centric nor phyto-centric, neither wholly clothed in metaphor, nor wholly revealed in 
their naked truth.18 
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